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ABSTRACT 
Studies conducted on the basis of agency theory and the recent 
developments of the managerial power theory have triggered many issues 
especially centered on the corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, this 
paper aims to investigate the effect of key variables - corporate governance 
structures, corporate performance, pay performance alignment policy and 
the use of remuneration consultants on directors' remuneration packages. 
The components of directors' remuneration packages tested are salary, fees, 
bonus, benefit-in-kind and other emoluments. The study also tests total 
directors' remuneration to investigate any significant different in the 
regression results. The study controls the effect of f ~ m  size and sector. 
Fourty one Malaysian public listed companies are selected based on the 
result eom the survey conducted by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) and published in the Malaysian Corporate Governance 
Report. 
Based on the multiple regression analysis, it is found that corporate 
governance structures - board size, board and remuneration committee 
independence and board diversity (gender and nationality) are significantly 
affect individual component of directors' remuneration packages. However, 
the impact of board diversity (nationality) on total directors' remuneration is 
insignificant. Corporate performance does affect the determination of total 
directors' remuneration for the component of other emoluments. The study 
also shows that companies that disclose pay performance alignment policy 
in the annual report do reward their directors according to what they declare 
with concentration on salary, fees and benefit-in-kind components without 
significantly affect the total directors' remuneration. The use of 
remuneration consultants does influence the design of directors' 
remuneration packages. Finally, the results show that agency theory and 
managerial power theory is relevant in partially explaining the components 
of directors' remuneration packages in Malaysia. 
Keywords: Directors' remuneration, corporate governance, Malaysia 
ABSTRAK 
Kajian yang dijalankan berdasarkan teori agensi dan perbincangan terkini 
terhadap teori kuasa pengurusan telah mencetuskan banyak isu terutamanya 
tertumpu kepada aspek tadbir urns korporat. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan 
untuk mengkaji kesan pembolehubah utama - struktur tadbir uius korporat, 
prestasi korporat, polisi pembayaran imbuhan berdasarkan prestasi dan 
penggunaan khidmat perunding ke atas setiap komponen pakej imbuhan 
pengarah. Komponen pakej imbuhan pengarah yang dikaji termasuklah gaji, 
yuran, bonus, manfaat berupa barangan dan emolumen lain. Kajian ini juga 
mengkaji jumlah imbuhan pengarah bagi mengenal pasti kewujudan 
perbezaan ketara dalam keputusan regresi. Kajian ini mengawal kesan saiz 
syarikat dan sektor. Empat puluh satu syarikat tersenarai di Malaysia telah 
dipilih berdasarkan hasil kajian yang dijalankan oleh Pengawas Pemegang 
Saham Minoriti (MSWG) dan disiarkan dalam Laporan Tadbir Urus 
Korporat Malaysia. 
Berdasarkan analisis regresi, didapati bahawa stuktur tadbir urus korporat - 
saiz lembaga pengarah, kebebasan lembaga pengarah dan jawatankuasa 
imbuhan serta kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah Cjantina dan 
kewarganegaraan) mempengaruhi dengan ketara setiap komponen pakej 
imbuhan pengarah. Bagaimanapun, kesan kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah 
. . 
(kewarganegaraan) terhadap j u d a h  imbuhanpengarah adalah tidak ketara. 
Prestasi koiporat mempengaiuhi penetapan jumlah imbuhan pengarah 
meliputi elemen emolument lain. Kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa 
syarikat yang menyatakan polisi pembayaran imbuhan berdasarkan prestasi 
di dalam laporan tahunan melaksanakan seperti yang dinyatakan dengan 
fokus kepada elemen gaji, yuran dan manfaat berupa barangan tanpa 
mempengarui secara ketara jumlah imbuhan pengarah. Penggunaan 
perunding imbuhan mempengaruhi penetapan pakej imbuhan lembaga. 
Akhirnya, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa teori agensi dan teori kuasa 
pengurusan adalah relevan dalam menjelaskan sebahagian hubungan bagi 
komponen pakej imbuhan pengarah di Malaysia. 
Kata kunci: Imbuhan pengarah, tadbir urus korporat, Malaysia 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Discussions on the issues of directors' remuneration packages are global 
phenomena (Jensen, 1993; Ewers, 2002; Clarkson et al., 2005; Chen, 2006; 
Abdullah, 2006; Salim and Wan-Hussin, 2009). Most of the earlier studies 
use a group of directors' remuneration packages namely, non-contingent 
pay (salary + other cash compensation), contingent pay (stock options + 
bonus + long-term incentives), cash compensation (salary + bonus), total 
remuneration (salary + bonus + fees + benefits + others), etc. (Mangel and 
Singh, 1993; Daily et a]., 1998; Dogan and Smyth, 2002). Essentially, there 
are only a few researches which separate the directors' remuneration 
components and test its relationship with one or two key variables. For 
example, study by Ewers (2002) in UK examines four components of 
directors' remuneration packages namely (i) ownership income; (ii) salary; 
(iii) short term bonus; and (iv) longer term incentive to test its relationship 
with coiporate perfolmance. Correspondingly, study by Clarkson et al. 
(2005) in Australia identifies four components of directors' remuneration 
packages namely (i) total remuneration; (ii) salary; (iii) bonus; and (iv) 
options to explain directors' remuneration. 
The fundamental theory supporting the discussion on directors' 
remuneration packages is the agency theory. The agency theory reflects the 
separation of power between owner (shareholders) and management which 
typically lead manager to pursue their own goals (agency problem) and 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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